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Abstract 
The EU is facing unprecedented challenges and significant threats to its economic 
and political security. Austerity, the Eurozone crisis, rising immigration and 
heightened fear of terrorism all present serious challenges to the process of 
integration. How does this context of insecurity impact on what the EU means to its 
citizens? Will the public become increasingly Eurosceptic or will they discover a 
hitherto unrecognised attachment to the EU as the prospect of its collapse becomes 
real? Psychological research has demonstrated that individual exposure to threat 
decreases cognitive capacity, inducing a tendency towards rigidity or conservatism - 
Ă ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇ ƚŽ ĐůŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĞǀŝů ǇŽƵ ŬŶŽǁ ?. So what might this mean for the 
European integration process? Using experimental techniques drawn from political 
psychology, the authors find a dual threat effect. The EU symbol has a negative (anti-
EU) effect on EU-related attitudes when presented in neutral context. This is 
consonant with conceptualisations of the EU as a threat to national cultural and 
political norms. In contrast, however, visual priming of participants with EU symbols 
has a positive (pro-EU) effect on related attitudes when these are presented in a 
context that implies a subtle but imminent threat to the benefits of EU membership.  
(199 words)  
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Introduction   
The EU is facing unprecedented challenges and significant threats to its economic 
and political security. The context of austerity, the Eurozone crisis, rising immigration 
and the heightened fear of terrorism all present serious challenges to the process of 
integration. How does this context of insecurity impact on what the EU means to its 
citizens? Will the public continue to become increasingly Eurosceptic or will they 
discover a hitherto unrecognised attachment to the EU as the prospect of its collapse 
(or in the UK case, of withdrawal) becomes real? Psychological research has 
demonstrated that individual exposure to threat decreases cognitive capacity, 
inducing a tendency towards rigidity or conservatism - a tendency to cling to the 
 ‘ĚĞǀŝůǇŽƵŬŶŽǁ ?.  So what might this mean for the European integration process? 
 
Threat is a central concept in the study of identity - that identities are often 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ŽĨ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ƚŚĞŵ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƵƐ ? ŝƐ
well recognised. Threat has also played a key role in the European integration 
process. Historically the formation of the EU took place in the shadow of threat: 
strategic threat, in the cold war context; the threat of economic domination of small 
states in a globalising world economy; and the internal threat of a rising communist 
presence. There exists, however, little systematic empirical engagement with the 
role played by threat in relation to public attitudes to the European Union.  Using 
experimental techniques drawn from political psychology, the authors examine the 
effect of implicit exposure to the EU symbol on a variety of EU related attitudes and 
ask whether this effect varies according to context, specifically in relation to threat.  
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Exposure to the EU symbol and exposure to a threatening or neutral context are 
manipulated using a group of Scottish national identifiers drawn from a Scottish 
University. Although partly directed by practical considerations, namely access to 
participants in a controlled environment, a Scottish sample has intrinsic value 
considering the ongoing public debate surrounding the forthcoming Scottish 
independence referendum (September 2014) and its implications for Scotland-EU 
and rest of the UK-EU relationships.  
 
In line with existing research on the attitudinal effects of exposure to implicit visual 
cues (Butz, Plant & Doerr, 2007a; Butz, 2009; Ehrlinger et al., 2011; Hassin et al., 
2007, 2009; Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008) and of exposure to threat contexts (Jost 
et al., 2003; Lavine & Lodge, 2005; Staw et al., 2007; Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011; 
Pantoja & Segura, 2012: 265-6), we expect to observe an interaction effect between 
implicit exposure to the EU symbol and manipulated threat context.  Specifically, we 
hypothesise that visual priming of the EU will have a positive (pro-EU) effect on 
related attitudes when presented in a context that implies a subtle but imminent 
threat to the benefits of EU membership. Indeed, our results suggest that the EU 
symbol has a negative (anti-EU) effect on EU-related attitudes when presented in 
neutral context.  In contrast, implicit exposure to the EU symbol produces pro-EU 
responses when the symbol is presented in a subtly threatening context. As 
insecurity and threat become increasingly commonplace in the EU context, the 
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insights from this experimental approach are timely and present new avenues for 
future research. 
 
In the theoretical framework, we examine the treatment of threat in the literature 
on European integration. It is argued that the extensive psychological literature 
which examines the cognitive, behavioural and motivational effects of threat has 
significant insights to offer. In the methodology section, we explain how an 
experimental approach, employing implicit visual cues, can elicit new empirical 
insights into the effect of threat contexts on EU related attitudes and discuss our 
expectations. The logic and design of the experiment is followed by the results. The 
empirical examination of the impact of contextual effects (specifically threat effects) 
on EU-related attitudes provides insights into key debates in EU integration studies.  
Specifically:  
(i) the relative importance of cultural/instrumental aspects of support 
for the EU system; 
(ii)  the existence of implicit support for the European Union - or the 
normalisation of EU membership as the status quo;  
(iii) the factors that influence the self-categorisation of individuals as 
national or as EU group-members. 
 
In conclusion, we consider limitations and wider implications of these findings.  
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Theoretical Framework 
Attitudinal and Behavioural Responses to Threat  
Political contexts in which threat, whether existential or manipulated, is present 
have long been recognised to have cognitive, behavioural and motivational effects 
(for an overview see Thórisdóttir & Jost 2011: 790; Pantoja & Segura 2012: 265-6). In 
a recent experimental study Thórisdóttir and  Jost (2011: 806) confirm this effect and 
demonstrate that a threatening context affects individual motivation and, in so doing 
appears (at least temporarily) to alter social and political attitudes.  
 
A well established position in relation to group cohesion ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĂŶĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ƚŚƌĞĂƚ
ĚƌĂǁƐŐƌŽƵƉŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌĂŶĚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐŐƌŽƵƉĐŽŚĞƐŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?(Staw et al. 2007: 
507). The study of intergroup conflict and the threat effect has a long history, 
particularly in relation to the study of race (Key 1943; Blalock 1967). Early studies of 
ŝŶƚĞƌŐƌŽƵƉ ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ŝŶ ďŽǇƐ ? ĐĂŵƉƐ ĂůƐŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ƌŽůĞ ƉůĂǇĞĚ ďǇ
external threat in inducing internal group cohesion (Sherif & Sherif 1953; Sherif et al. 
1961). More recently, Campbell (2006) has shown that the threat effect, and its 
underlying logic of group conflict, is generalisable to the case of religion. Using 
ƐƵƌǀĞǇĚĂƚĂ ?ĂŵƉďĞůůĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ũƵƐƚĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĂĐŝů ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƐŚŽǁƐ
whites responding to the presence of blacks, evangelicals respond to the presence of 
secularists ? suggesting that their presidential vote is at least partly motivated by 
 “ƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐƚŚƌĞĂƚ ? ? ? ?Campbell 2006: 111) 
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A strong link emerges between conservatism and threat contexts. A tendency to 
ĐůŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŬŶŽǁŶŝƐŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚ P ‘dŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐƋƵŽ ?ŶŽŵĂƚƚĞƌŚŽǁĂǀĞrsive, is a known 
condition and is therefore easier to predict and imagine than a potentially different 
ƐƚĂƚĞŽĨĂĨĨĂŝƌƐƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚďĞĞŝƚŚĞƌďĞƚƚĞƌŽƌǁŽƌƐĞ ?(Thórisdóttir & Jost 2011: 789). 
Reviewing the literature on the effects of threat, and building on the insights of Jost 
et al. (2003), Lavine et al (2005: 221) argue that threat, however it is conceived, 
 ‘ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐ
(conventionalism), submission to perceived legitimate authority, and aggression 
against out-ŐƌŽƵƉƐ ? ? 
 
Threat and European Integration 
This wider literature provides useful insights for the study of the EU. Both: (i) the 
impact of threat on group cohesion and; (ii) the tendency towards conservatism 
when faced with threat, deserve further empirical exploration. The concept of threat 
has, of course, played a more or less explicit, role in a number of debates on the 
European integration, and most commonly on the role played by the EU as a threat 
to national practices and identities. A key task for scholars of the multi-level EU is to 
establish the conditions under which the EU is itself viewed as a threat  W ƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚĞŵ ?
ƚŽƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ƵƐ ? W and, conversely, under what conditions the EU is perceived, by 
national identifiers within the member states, ƚŽĨŽƌŵƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ‘ƵƐ ? ?
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i. dŚĞhĂƐdŚƌĞĂƚ PdŚĞ ‘dŚĞŵ ?ƚŽŽƵƌNational  ‘hƐ ? 
Key to understanding what shapes attitudes towards the European Union is an 
appreciation of the nature and complexities of the relationship between European 
Union identity and the range of national state identities and sub-state national 
identities with which it interacts. Mols and Haslam (2008) emphasise, for example, 
the importance of context in their study of the effect of regional identity salience in 
shaping support for European integration. An extensive literature also draws upon 
the analytic emphasis on social group considerations  W as opposed to purely 
individualistic ones - developed by the social identity theoretical approach (Tajfel et 
al. 1971; Tajfel & Turner 1979, 1986; Turner 1985; Turner et al. 1987) to understand 
the relationship between the range of identities at play in the European Union and 
to analyse their effect on attitudes to European integration (Marcussen et al. 1999; 
Mols & Haslam 2008; Mols et al. 2009; Carey 2002; Mclaren 2006; Lubbers 2008; 
Caporaso & Kim 2009; Hooghe & Marks 2008; Curley 2009; Genna 2009; Risse 2010).   
 
Drawing on similar insights, Mclaren, for instance, has argued that the traditional 
focus on individualistic cost/benefit analyses in the EU attitudes literature has led to 
a neglect of the explanatory power of perceived threat to group (cultural) values 
(Mclaren, 2002, 2006). For some, Mclaren ĂƌŐƵĞƐ P  ‘ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƚĞŵƐ
ĨƌŽŵ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĚĞŐƌĂĚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ƐǇŵďŽůƐ ? ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ
ĂŶĚƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? ?Mclaren 2006: 191). Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) similarly find that 
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research on Euroscepticism has been skewed by the focus on individual 
instrumentalism rather than shared political culture (see also Lubbers, 2008).  
The extent to which support for European integration is driven more or less by 
group/cultural or instrumental motivations is a longstanding debate. In one of the 
earliest quantitative studies of EU identity, Gabel found that utilitarian theories, 
which emphasised the contingency of political regime support, provided a more 
robust predictor of support for European integration than cognitive mobilization and 
political values theories (Gabel, 1998). This utilitarian approach, though subject to 
criticism (Anderson, 1998; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000) dominated the study of EU 
support for many years.  In a series of recent articles, Hooghe and Marks examine 
the relative roles of group identity and economic rationality in driving public 
attitudes towards the European Union. Their conclusion is that, in fact identity may 
have the explanatory edge. Although along with communal identities, economic 
interests continue to play a crucial role in determining support for the EU (Hooghe & 
Marks 2004, 2005).  
 
From the perspective examined in this section, the hƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐƚŚĞ ‘ƚŚĞŵ ?ƚŽƚŚĞ
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ƵƐ ?ŽĨ member state citizens.  
 
ii. The EU under Threat: The EU  ‘hƐ ?ƚŽĂŶƵŶĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ‘dŚĞŵ ? 
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There has been a growing normalisation of the EU in the lives of its citizens.  In terms 
of daily reality - including personal and business relationships, travel and consumer 
trends (Diez Medrano, 2008). There is a growing recognition that while few would 
 ‘ĚŝĞ ĨŽƌ ƵƌŽƉĞ ?(Smith, 1995), daily exposure to EU related norms, symbols and 
practices is likely to play a role in shaping identification with and support for the 
European Union (Bruter 2003, 2009; Castiglione, 2009; Manners, 2011; McNamara, 
2010; Priban, 2009; Trenz 2004, 2006). For most EU citizens their relationship with 
the EU is largely based on daily low-level engagement with the EU in unremarkable 
ways (carrying passports or driving licences, conforming with legislation, walking 
past EU flags), which remind citizens of their involvement in the larger EU system 
whether for good or ill. 
 
These routines and habits, by acting as daily reminders of belonging, in Billig's 
(1995:43) ƚĞƌŵƐ ?  ‘ƐĞƌǀĞ ƚŽ ƚƵƌŶ ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ ƐƉĂĐĞ ŝŶƚŽ ŚŽŵĞůĂŶĚƐƉĂĐĞ ? ?
Normalization of the EU occurs as new rules and routines or integrative habits 
transform understandings of the place of the EU within the lives and imaginings of its 
citizens into a state of normality such that a re-imagination of the EU and of the 
meaning and utility of membership of the EU becomes possible and a collective 
forgetting that life ǁĂƐ ĞǀĞƌ ŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ ƚĂŬĞƐ ƉůĂĐĞ ? ǀĞŶ ƚŚĞ ǀĞƌǇ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘DĞŵďĞƌ
^ƚĂƚĞ ? ŝƐĂŶƵŶƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞďƵƚĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚimplicit reminder of membership/belonging 
to the EU.  
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However, while a growing implicit normalisation of EU membership may be taking 
place, for a mass of individuals to identify explicitly with a state they must first 
 ‘ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŽ  ‘ĞǀŽŬĞ
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?(Bloom 1990: 61). Central to this experience, Bloom argued, was the 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? dŚŝƐ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƐǇŵďŽůƐ Žf the state 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŝŶƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŚƌĞĂƚ ?ŽƌƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐǇŵďŽůƐŽĨ
ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ďĞŚĂǀĞ ďĞŶĞĨŝĐĞŶƚůǇ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ? ? Deutsch et al. (1957: 85), 
ŵĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ĚŽƵďůĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨhabit-ďƌĞĂŬŝŶŐ ? PƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
which citizens, exposed to the benefits available from a new level of government, 
start to break the habit of allegiance to the existing political unit. The extent of the 
emerging habit of attachment to the alternative political unit is revealed when the 
new benefits come under threat - thus challenging the value of the current 
allegiance. Building on these approaches, it has been argued that, explicit 
attachment to the EU is ŵŽƐƚ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ďĞĐŽŵĞ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚ P  ‘ǁŚĞŶ ŚŝƚŚĞƌƚo 
ƵŶƌĞĐŽŐŶŝǌĞĚďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĐŽŵĞƵŶĚĞƌƚŚƌĞĂƚ ? ? &ƌŽŵƚŚŝƐ
perspective, a latent European  ‘UƐ ?ŵŝŐŚƚemerge in a threatening context.  
 
Implicit Visual Cues 
A growing body of research in the field of cognitive psychology demonstrates the 
impact on political preferences and behaviour of subtle exposure to primes that are 
connected to national associations, such as flags, emblems or anthems (Butz, Plant & 
Doerr 2007a; Butz 2009; Ehrlinger et al. 2011; Ferguson & Hassin 2007; Hassin et al. 
2007, 2009; Gilboa & Bodner 2009; Kemmelmeier & Winter 2008).
 
 Since the human 
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ability for conscious procesƐŝŶŐŽĨ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ?,ĂƐƐŝŶĞƚĂůĂƌŐƵĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝĨ
ideologies depended on conscious resources for their operation, they would have 
been much less efficient in controlling our behavior than if they did not depend on 
ƚŚĞƐĞ ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? ?t ?Ğ ŚĞŶĐĞ ŚǇƉŽƚhesise that ideologies and, more specifically, 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĞƐĐĂŶŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŶŽŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐůǇ ?(Hassin et al. 2009). Central to this 
literature is the importance of unconscious associations and behaviours provoked by 
exposure to national symbols.  
 
Most of these experiments employ Billig's (1995)  ‘ďĂŶĂů ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ĂŶĚ
find that implicit exposure to images, such as the flags of established nations, has a 
measurable effect on related attitudes moderated by existing national attachments 
(Hassin et al. 2009, 2007). Hassin et al. (2007, 2009) and Butz et al (2007a) 
demonstrate the effects of subtle exposure to the Israeli and US flags, and how these 
flags activate existing attachments (positive or negative). In a more recent study, 
Ehrlinger et al. (2011) found that US participants primed with the Confederate flag 
were less willing to vote for Barack Obama and were more likely to view black 
candidates negatively. These experimental findings provide support for the 
ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ national symbols is to bring to mind the 
concepts and emotions associated wŝƚŚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ?Butz 2009: 173) and for the 
context-dependent, situational nature of group identifications (Tajfel & Turner 1979; 
Turner et al. 1987). 
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Similar experimental studies have been adapted for application in the EU context.  
Bruter's (2003) innovative experimental study of the effect of news and symbols on 
EU identity makes a major contribution to this literature.  As does his panel analysis 
on the time-bomb effect of news and symbols on political identity (Bruter 2009). An 
experimental study comparing four national identity groups in the UK, also found 
that functional visual cues, which associate the EU with practical benefits, such as 
the free mobility of EU citizens (the EU symbol at passport control) have a stronger 
effect on mass attitudes than abstract symbolic reminders of EU membership (the 
ceremonial EU flag). The study found, moreover, that instrumental attitudes to the 
EU (characterised by cost/benefit calculations) were more affected by exposure to 
the implicit visual cues than affective associations (characterised by emotional or 
sentimental attachment) (Cram & Patrikios, forthcoming). 
 
Expectations 
Linking the role of implicit visual cues with the role of threat in forging group 
cohesiveness and regime support, we expect: 
Hypothesis 1: In a neutral context, exposure to the EU symbol will have a negative 
(anti-EU) attitudinal effect, inclining respondents to prioritise allegiance to the nation 
- ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵŝŶŐƚŚĞhĂƐƚŚĞ ?KƚŚĞƌ ? ? 
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Hypothesis 2: In a subtly threatening context, exposure to the EU symbol will have a 
positive (pro-EU) attitudinal effect, inclining respondents to prioritise allegiance to 
the EU ? ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵŝŶŐƚŚĞhĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƚŚĞ ?hƐ ? ?
 
Research Design 
We examined the effect of implicit exposure to the EU symbol on two related types 
of responses, and assessed how context moderated this effect. We manipulated 
exposure to the EU symbol and exposure to a threatening or neutral context (text). 
In detail, we distributed a short survey questionnaire, which included a front page 
that combined image and text, plus instructions. The front page combination 
included one of two versions of a photographic image (control vs. EU symbol), 
accompanied by an excerpt from a mock news story (threatening vs. neutral 
headline text) (see Appendix). The control image plays an important role in ensuring 
that it is the effect of the specific EU symbol that we are measuring rather than 
simply the presence or otherwise of a flag. The image was used to achieve the subtle 
exposure of participants to the EU symbol (or its absence).  
 
Based on the findings of a recent study (Cram & Patrikios, forthcoming), we used the 
EU symbol in a functional context, that is, displayed at passport control in an airport. 
Presentation of the EU symbol in a functional context, as opposed to its presentation 
simply as a flag, was shown to make a difference in this study. To achieve an equally 
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implicit manipulation of context, the mock news headline and excerpt were worded 
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂŶǇŵĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ “h ?Žƌ “ƵƌŽƉĞ ?ŽƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞĨĞƌĞŶƚƐ ? 
 
Participants were asked to provide responses to closed questions that gauged 
attitudes towards the EU (adapted from recent Eurobarometer surveys). Drawing on 
our discussion of the pivotal role of implicit threat, we predict that exposure to the 
EU symbol wŝůů ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ŵŽƌĞ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƚŚĞ h  ? “ĂŶƚŝ-h ?
responses) when presented under a neutral context. Exposure to the EU symbol will 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƚŚĞ h  ? “ƉƌŽ-h ? responses) when 
presented within a threatening context.  
A note is in order here. We attempt to measure the short term effects of exposure to 
the implicit visual cues. It may therefore be the case that the display of signage and 
the impact of threat context, especially through repeated exposure, has a more 
permanent effect on EU related attitudes (see Bruter, 2009). Our dataset does not 
allow us to test this possibility. Nevertheless, recent findings (Carter, Ferguson, and 
Hassin, 2011) suggest that even a single, brief exposure to a flag has durable 
consequences on voting behaviour.   
 
Additionally, this study deals only with Scottish national identifiers. National identity 
and member state citizenship are not always contiguous in the EU. The UK is, for 
example, the member state of the EU and citizens of all four UK nations are UK 
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citizens, and EU citizens. However, only some of these citizens would identify 
themselves as primarily 'British' nationals when given the alternative option to 
identify themselves as Scots, English, Welsh or Irish. A similar situation applies, for 
example, in Belgium, Spain and Italy. We thus distinguish in this study between 
citizenship status (legal membership of a member state) and declared national 
identity (a sense of belonging to a territorial unit). Of course, analysis of the 
responses of Scottish identifiers might suffer in terms of generalisability to the other 
countries of the UK. Indeed, there is some evidence that Scottish and Welsh 
identifiers are more strongly affected by exposure to the EU functional symbol than 
equivalent groups of English national identifiers.  
 
Procedure 
One-hundred-and-thirty-six students participated in the experiment, all first year 
politics undergraduates. The study adopted a 2 (control image vs. EU image) x 2 
(neutral vs. threatening text) design. We analyse here only the responses of the 
ninety-ƚŚƌĞĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ǁŚŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ ĂƐ  “^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ ?  ? “/ĨǇŽƵ ǁĞƌĞ ĨŽƌĐĞĚ ƚŽ
ĐŚŽŽƐĞ ?ǁŽƵůĚǇŽƵŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨĂƐ ? ?^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ ?ƌŝƚŝƐŚ ?Kther). 
 
Following standard procedure in the experimental literature cited in this paper, the 
study took place in a lecture theatre and involved the completion of a printed 
questionnaire. Upon arrival, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the four 
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versions of the questionnaire cover (two images by two mock headlines; see 
Appendix). While typically a pre- and post-test design might be superior, the risk of 
making participants aware of the nature of the study, and therefore cancelling the 
implicit nature of our intervention, makes a one-off randomised assignment the 
preferable option (see examples of this design used with similar, small student 
samples in Hassin et al. 2007, 2009; Kemmelmeier & Winter 2008; Butz 2009; Gilboa 
& Bodner 2009; Ehrlinger et al. 2011). We analyse the impact of the implicit visual 
cue and whether this is moderated by context (type of text) on the following 
dependent variables:  
 
Variable a: Reaction to hypothetical dissolution of the EU 
If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, how 
ƐŽƌƌǇŽƌƉůĞĂƐĞĚǁŽƵůĚǇŽƵďĞ ? ?сǀĞƌǇƐŽƌƌǇ ? ?сƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚƐŽƌƌǇ ? ?сǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚ
make any difference; 4=somewhat pleased; 5=very pleased 
 
Variable b: Future self-image 
In the near future do you see yourself as: 1=Scottish only; 2=Scottish and 
European; 3=European and Scottish; 4=European only 
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Dependent variable a (to hypothetical dissolution of the EU) was recoded as an 
inverse scale with higher values showing more positive feelings towards the EU 
 ? “ƐŽƌƌǇ ? ǁŝƚŚ h Ěŝssolution). This variable was entered into a regression with the 
following predictor variables: exposure to the visual prime (image type: neutral=0 or 
EU=1); exposure to type of context (headline text: neutral=0 or threatening=1); 
interaction term (image x headline). Dependent variable b (Future Self-image) was 
recoded as a dichotomous variable with the following categories: Scottish only, with 
56 cases; Scottish and European, with 37 cases (includes the following categories: 
 “^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚĂŶĚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ?ǁŝƚŚ ? ? ĐĂƐĞƐ ? “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĂŶĚ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ ?ǁŝƚŚĂƐŝŶŐůĞĐĂƐĞ ?
 “ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶŽŶůǇ ?ǁŝƚŚǌĞƌŽĐĂƐĞƐ ? ?dŚŝƐǀĂƌŝĂďůĞǁĂƐĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚŝŶĂ ? ?ŝŵĂŐĞƚǇƉĞ ?ǆ ?
(dichotomous dependent variable) cross-tabulation, replicated across the two 
contexts (neutral vs. threatening headline). 
 
The final question of the short questionnaire asked participants to add any 
comments about the questionnaire. None of the participants indicated awareness of 
the manipulation.  
 
Results 
We first analyse responses to dependent variable a (Reaction to Dissolution). Table 1 
shows results of two ordered logit regression models. The estimates in Model 1 
suggest that the main effect of each of the two variables  W exposure to image and 
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exposure to headline - is not significant. In other words, exposure to each of these 
variables alone does not affect responses on the outcome variable. This is consistent 
with existing research, cited in previous sections, on the attitudinal effects of 
exposure to national flags.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
However, the interaction term in Model 2 in Table 1 is significant (b=2.05, p<.05). It 
is also the only positive estimate produced by the model. Therefore a score of 1 on 
the interaction term predicts a higher score in the outcome variable on the ordered 
log odds scale. A score of 1 in the interaction term measures exposure to the EU 
symbol and to the threatening headline. It appears then that exposure to the EU 
visual cue has a positive (pro-EU) effect on reactions to dissolution only when 
moderated by exposure to the (threatening) headline. Exposure to the EU visual cue 
has no effect on its own.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates this interaction effect in terms of percentage changes. The 
vertical axis shows percentages of pro-h  ? “ƐŽƌƌǇ ? ? ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂů
dissolution question. The horizontal axis shows exposure to the control/treatment 
visual cue. The two panels show exposure to the neutral/threatening headline. As 
the figure suggests, when accompanied by a neutral headline, exposure to the EU 
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symbol produces negative (anti-EU) reactions to a hypothetical EU dissolution 
(respondents are more likely to feel pleased) compared to the group exposed to the 
control image. When accompanied by a threatening headline, exposure to the EU 
symbol produces positive (pro-EU) reactions to a hypothetical EU dissolution 
(respondents are more likely to feel sorry) compared to the group exposed to the 
control image. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The second dependent variable we used was a dichotomous variable about 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ĨƵƚƵƌĞƐĞůĨ-image solely as nationals or as nationals and Europeans. We 
analysed the relationship between exposure to the visual cue and the dummy 
dependent variable across the two contexts (mock news excerpt), by creating a 
square table for each context. The upper panel of Table 2 suggests that, in a neutral 
context, the EU symbol affects self-image in an anti-EU direction: 81% in the group 
ĞǆƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ h ƐǇŵďŽů ǁŽƵůĚ ƐĞĞ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ĂƐ  “^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ ŽŶůǇ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĂƌ
future, compared to 41% who would say the same in the group exposed to the 
control image. It would appear then that in a neutral context, the EU image creates a 
backlash phenomenon: a push away from future identification as European. This is a 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĞĨĨĞĐƚ ?ʖ2(1)=7.09, p=.01]. Regarding the strength of this relationship, the 
ŵĂŐŶŝƚƵĚĞ ŽĨ <ĞŶĚĂůů ?Ɛ ƚĂƵ-b (-.41) suggests that this is not a trivial effect. The 
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finding is consistent, for example, with MclĂƌĞŶ ?Ɛ(2002) insights in relation to the 
explanatory power of perceived threat to cultural values.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The lower panel of Table 2, however, suggests that when the EU symbol is presented 
in a threatening context, this backlash effect disappears. Specifically, the percentage 
split now suggests that the EU flag makes no difference.  In other words, exposure to 
ƐƵďƚůĞ ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶŝŶŐ ƚĞǆƚƵĂů ĐƵĞƐ ŵŽĚĞƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ  “ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ? ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽĨ
the EU symbol (neutral context, upper panel of Table 2), whereby respondents 
ĞǆƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƚŚĞhƐǇŵďŽůƌĞĂĐƚĞĚďǇƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚƐĞĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐ “^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ
ŽŶůǇ ? ? ZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚŽƐĞ ĞǆƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ h ŝŵĂŐĞ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ĂƌĞ ŶŽǁ
ĞǀĞŶůǇ ƐƉůŝƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ŽƉƚŝŽŶƐ P  ? ?A?ƐĂǇ  “^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ ŽŶůǇ ? ?while 48% 
choose the mixed identity option. Therefore, when exposed to the EU image in an 
implicitly threatening context, participants may become less likely to see themselves 
ĂƐ  “^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ ŽŶůǇ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĂƌ ĨƵƚƵƌĞ ? ĂŶĚ ŵŽƌĞ ůŝŬĞůǇ ƚŽ ŽƉƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?U 
identity mix option (48% compared to only 19% in the neutral context). The 
relationship between exposure to the visual cue and future self-image is not 
significant [ʖ 2(1)=.79, ns] in the lower panel of Table 2 (threatening context). 
Compared to the significant relationship in the upper panel of Table 2 (non-
threatening or neutral context), this indicates an interaction effect between visual 
cue and context, with context moderating the effect of the cue. 
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These effects dovetail with theoretical expectations regarding how a subtle threat to 
the practical benefits associated with the EU (primed by the visual cue) could move 
respondents to positive opinions on and identification with the EU. On the other 
hand, when threat is absent, the visual reminder of those benefits works in the 
opposite direction by producing anti-EU responses.  
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the concept of threat in the EU literature is most commonly invoked in 
ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ h ĂƐ Ă  ‘ƐǇŵďŽůŝĐ ƚŚƌĞĂƚ ?  W ƚŚĞ h  ‘ƚŚĞŵ ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶal  ‘ƵƐ ? ĨŽƌ
member state citizens. However, it has also been argued that presenting the hitherto 
unrecognised benefits of EU membership under threat might reveal a greater degree 
of implicit attachment to the EU than previously recognised. The empirical analysis 
presented here builds upon two key insights from cognitive research: (i) the 
importance of implicit exposure to national symbols such as flags for related 
attitudes; and (ii) the importance of contextual effects, specifically threat contexts, in 
shaping attitudinal and behavioural responses. Our interpretation of what we have 
observed in the EU context is consistent with what might be described as a 'dual 
threat effect': 
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i. In a neutral context, the EU symbol itself appears to represent threat - a 
potential threat to national group identity. In this case, the salient social 
identity is the national  W in this case Scottish identity. The tendency to 
preserve the status quo thus manifests itself in a relative willingness to see 
the EU dissolved and as attachment to the national group identity. This effect 
is consistent, for example, with the arguments of Mclaren (2002, 2006) and 
Lubbers & Scheepers (2005) who have emphasised the importance of 
'cultural threat' in shaping attitudes towards European integration. From this 
perspective the potential functional benefits of EU membership appear 
secondary to the threat that membership poses to national identity.  
ii. In contrast, when the EU symbol is presented in a subtly threatening context 
 W whereby the practical benefits of EU membership primed by the symbol 
appear to be under threat - ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇ ?ŽĨhŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ
appears to emerge. This time, the symbolic threat to national identity is 
clearly secondary to the practical benefits or 'goods' which might be lost. In 
this case, the tendency to preserve the status quo is manifested in an 
increased reluctance to see the EU dissolved. What we also observe, by 
manipulating the threat context, is an increase in perceptions of shared 
national/EU identity. Perhaps even an emerging EU 'us' to an undefined, 
external 'them'. 
 
The findings are consistent with the wider literature on threat rigidities (the 
tendency towards conservatism when respondents are placed in threat context) and 
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on the implications of threat for group conflict/categorisation (the shifting 
ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨ ‘ƵƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞŵ ?ŝŶƚŚƌĞĂƚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ?/ŶĂŶĞƵƚƌĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ƚŚĞfunctional 
EU symbol itself represents the threat to the salient social identity  W the Scottish 
national identity. The tendency to conservatism results in this case in greater 
willingness to see the EU dissolved and greater attachment to the national group 
identity. In contrast, when the EU symbol is presented in a threatening context, the 
h ďĞĐŽŵĞƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĞǀŝů ǇŽƵ ŬŶŽǁ ? ?This time, the tendency to rigidity results in 
greater reluctance to see the EU dissolved and in an increased perception of shared 
national/EU identity.  
 
There are certain points that could not be addressed within the present study.  First, 
the results are based on a narrow and perhaps idiosyncratic group of respondents - 
young, educated Scottish identifiers (but see the use of equally idiosyncratic samples 
in Carter et al., 2011). Beyond considerations of external validity, a Scottish study is 
valuable in itself since the EU dimension (continued Scottish membership, 
differences in Scottish-English levels of EU support and the implications of any future 
UK referendum on EU membership) is a key aspect of the constitutional debate 
surrounding the forthcoming Scottish independence referendum. And addressing 
considerations of generalisability, the research design employed here can be applied 
to other national identity groups (including those in prospective member states) and 
comparatively. Different types of threat effects could also be measured.  Second, the 
empirical results refer only to short term effects of experimental exposure. In real 
life, these effects would probably be repetitive and would work through 
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accumulation and reinforcement. This limitation of the research design partly 
explains the low explanatory power of the model presented in Table 1 (low Pseudo 
R
2
). An experimental design that accommodates both repeated and implicit 
exposure poses technical challenges that could not be tackled in the present paper 
and with the resources available. However our study provides an experimental 
design on which such a future study could be developed. Finally, although the 
interpretation of the findings relies heavily on the role of group identity, our 
research design does not examine this role directly (but see Cram & Patrikios, 
forthcoming). 
 
Limitations notwithstanding, there is clear evidence of an interaction effect between 
implicit exposure to the visual cues and the manipulated threat context. These 
findings, along with future comparative work on the topic, can contribute to the 
wider literature on threat rigidities (the tendency towards conservatism when 
respondents are placed in threat contexts). They can also inform scholarship on the 
implications of threat for group conflict/categorisation (the shifting evaluations of 
 ‘ƵƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞŵ ?ŝŶƚŚƌĞĂƚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚs).  
 
On more substantive implications of the findings, as the very real prospect, for 
example, of an in-out referendum on UK membership of the EU unfolds, the issue of 
how threat of UK exit impacts on public attitudes and behaviour is likely to be a 
prime concern. More widely, the current context of insecurity surrounding the 
Eurozone, growing geo-political insecurity and the high visibility of Eurosceptic voices 
in the European public sphere appear to put the future of the EU project at great 
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risk. We consider the tone of the current debates as a quintessentially threatening 
context for EU-related attitudes. As this study finds, however, a threatening context 
is not necessarily a negative development for levels of public support for the EU. 
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Appendix: Experimental Procedure and Materials 
 
Four versions of a printed questionnaire were placed face-down in four separate 
sections of the lecture theatre. Each section corresponded to a different version of the 
short questionnaire, specifically to a different cover page. Each section of the lecture 
theatre was separated from the adjacent section either by a corridor (vertically) or by 
a number of empty rows (horizontally). Upon arrival to the lecture theatre, students 
were randomly assigned by the research team to one of the four sections.  The study 
was conducted at the beginning of class and was introduced as part of a departmental 
research project. Participants were not informed about the experimental nature of the 
study. They were first asked only to read the cover page very carefully. They were 
then asked to complete the short questionnaire that appeared overleaf. The cover 
ƉĂŐĞŚĂĚ “ůĂŶĚƐĐĂƉĞ ?ŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞƐƵƌǀĞǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚŽǀĞƌůĞĂĨǁĞƌĞ
ŝŶ “ƉŽƌƚƌĂŝƚ ?ŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞĐŽǀĞƌƉĂŐĞĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞĚĂŚŝŐ ƋƵĂůŝƚǇƉŚŽƚŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐŝŵĂŐĞ
(7.5cm x 10cm, in colour), a title in large capitalised font, and an excerpt from a mock 
ŶĞǁƐƉĂƉĞƌ ƌĞƉŽƌƚ ? dŚĞƐĞ ǁĞƌĞ ĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞĚ ďǇ ďƌŝĞĨ ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐ  ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ  “WůĞĂƐĞ
ƌĞĂĚƚŚĞƌĞƉŽƌƚ ? ? ?dŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐĞĚƚŝƚůĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƵƌǀĞǇƌĞĂĚ “^ŽĐŝĂůdƌĞŶĚƐ^ƵƌǀĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?
The excerpt made no reference to the EU. The four versions of the cover page (two 
versions of the image by two versions of the excerpt) were the following: 
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NEW LOOK LOUNGES
$XWKRULWLHVµGHOLJKWHGZLWKQHZLPDJH¶
Travellers enjoy the facilities
following the recent airport
refurbishment. New decor and seating
were welcomed by holiday-makers
and business travellers setting off on
their journeys. Public authorities
stated, µZH are delighted with our
new LPDJH¶.
AIRPORT REFURBISHMENT COMPLETE
 
Figure A1: Control cue under a neutral frame 
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Figure A2: EU cue under a neutral frame  
 
  
NEW LOOK LOUNGES
$XWKRULWLHVµGHOLJKWHGZLWKQHZLPDJH¶
Travellers enjoy the facilities
following the recent airport
refurbishment. New decor and seating
were welcomed by holiday-makers
and business travellers setting off on
their journeys. Public authorities
stated, µZH are delighted with our
new LPDJH¶.
AIRPORT REFURBISHMENT COMPLETE
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Figure A3: Control cue under a threatening frame  
 
  
HIGH ALERT STATUS CONTINUES
$XWKRULWLHVµVDIHW\RIRXUFLWL]HQVLV
SDUDPRXQW¶
Passengers reported continued concern about
disruption to travel plans. Heightened security
measures remain in place and a series of new
measures are under consideration. Public
authorities state that the alert status of airports
is kept under constant review. 'Our primary
concern is the safety of our citizens'.
TERROR THREATS DISRUPT TRAVEL PLANS
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HIGH ALERT STATUS CONTINUES
$XWKRULWLHVµVDIHW\RIRXUFLWL]HQVLV
SDUDPRXQW¶
Passengers reported continued concern about
disruption to travel plans. Heightened security
measures remain in place and a series of new
measures are under consideration. Public
authorities state that the alert status of airports
is kept under constant review. 'Our primary
concern is the safety of our citizens'.
TERROR THREATS DISRUPT TRAVEL PLANS
 
Figure A4: EU cue under a threatening frame  
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Figure 1. Exposure to the EU symbol in a threatening context creates pro-EU 
reactions on EU dissolution question 
 
 
 
Note: dŚĞǀĞƌƚŝĐĂůĂǆŝƐƐŚŽǁƐĐŽůůĂƉƐĞĚƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞƐŽĨ “ǀĞƌǇƐŽƌƌǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚ
ƐŽƌƌǇ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ?dŚĞŚŽƌŝǌŽŶƚĂůĂǆŝƐƐŚŽǁƐĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞƚŽĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚǀŝƐƵĂů
cue. The two panels show exposure to the neutral/threatening headline. 
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Table 1. Exposure to the EU symbol in a threatening context affects reactions to 
hypothetical EU dissolution 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Reaction to EU dissolution 
  
Model 1 Model 2 
Exposure to symbol 
.21 
(.41) 
-.91 
(.62) 
  
  
Exposure to headline  
-.52 
(.41) 
-1.84** 
(.69) 
   
Symbol × headline - 
2.05* 
(.87) 
   
-2LL difference (ʖ2) 1.86 7.62* 
Pseudo R
2
 .02 .09 
N 90 
Note: Main cell entries are ordered log odds. Standard errors 
in parenthesis. Higher values on the dependent variable show 
positive EU responses (sorry for dissolution). A score of zero in 
the dichotomous variables shows exposure to the control 
condition. 
** p < 0.01  * p < 0.05   
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Table 2. Exposure to the EU symbol in a threatening context affects perceptions of 
future self-image 
 
NEUTRAL HEADLINE  
 Future self-image 
Total Scottish Scottish-European  
Control image 
(Base=17) 
41% 59% 100% 
    
EU image 
(Base=26) 
81% 19% 100% 
    
Total 65% 35% 100% 
 
THREATENING HEADLINE  
 Future self-image 
Total Scottish Scottish-European  
Control image 
(Base=17) 
65% 35% 100% 
    
EU image 
(Base=33) 
52% 48% 100% 
    
Total 56% 44% 100% 
 
 
 
 
